# Four Extra Neolib/Cap K Answers

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### Perm Solvency

#### The perm solves - incremental changes are crucial for coalitions against capitalism – The alt isn’t viable and won’t change mindsets.

Grossberg 92 (Larry, Professor of Communication Studies @ UNC-CH, *We Gotta Get Out of this Place*, 1992)

If it is capitalism that is at stake, our moral opposition to it has to be tempered by the realities of the world and possibilities of political change. Taking a simple negative relation to it, as if the moral condemnation of the evil of capitalism were ever sufficient (granting that it does establish grotesque systems of inequality and oppression, is not likely to establish a viable political agenda. First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to overthrow capitalism in the current situation. Unfortunately, despite our desires, "the masses" are not waiting for the revolution, and it is not simply a case of their failure to recognize their own best interests, as if we did. Are we to decide--rather undemocratically, I might add--to overthrow capitalism in spite of their legitimate desires? Second, as much as capitalism is the cause of many of the major threats facing the world, at the moment it may also be one of the few forces of stability, unity and even, within limits, a certain civility in the world. The world system is, unfortunately, simply too precarious and the alternative options not all that promising. Finally, the appeal of an as yet unarticulated and even unimagined future, while perhaps powerful as a moral imperative, is simply too weak in the current context to effectively organize people, and too vague to provide any direction. Instead, the left must think of ways to rearticulate capitalism without either giving up the critique or naively assuming that it can create a capitalism "with a human heart." Leaving such images to Hollywood, the Left can organize to change specific axiomatics of capitalism in particular local, regional, national and global contexts.

### Geopolitics Answer

#### Our Geopolitics take out – the critique can’t outweigh or turn case – geopolitics is not based on capital.

Shaw, ’85 (Sociology Lecturer – Hull, Marxist Sociology Revisited, p. 266-7)

We can start by discussing more explicitly what increasingly looks like the Achilles heel of attempts to understand the modern state simply as a capitalist institution. This is the fact that, in emphasizing the determination of the state by class struggle, the Marxist theory has systematically neglected one of the most fundamental features of any state: its territorial basis. If the state, as Max Weber defined it, is an organization claiming a monopoly of coercion within a given territory, then states always function in relation to the forms of social organization in other territories, and especially to other states. They are always concerned with their boundaries with other states (in a power as well as a strictly geographical sense). They normally operate within a system of states, and the external relationships are as important as (and under given circumstances can be considerably more important than) the internal relationships with class forces. As Otto Hintze put it, ‘External conflicts between states form the shape of the state’, within which social structure and the pattern of class conflict are formed. The geopolitical framework pre-existed capitalism, which originated within particular states and a European state system. Few would dispute, of course, that once capitalism developed so far as to transform national economies, then it began to have a very profound effect on states and indeed the state system. Capitalism provided the economic basis for a massive expansion of the state’s resources; the social basis for unprecedented political mobilization of the population; and the technical basis for qualitatively more destructive forms of warfare. At the same time, states obviously became more responsive to the needs, interests and demands of capital within their territory, and this affected their external as well as internal operation. As Marxist writers on imperialism stressed, states were concerned with the extent to which they, or firms operating from their base territory, could operate profitably in other territories, and they sought to control or intervene in them partly for such reasons. In all senses, modern states and state systems can be seen as capitalist (although this begs the question of the nature of present day Communist states, to which we return below). Similarly, previous forms of state and state system (the classical empires and city states, medieval states, the absolute monarchies etc.) can be partly explained in terms of the socio-economic relations of the period. But any such explanations run the risk of neglecting the extent to which the state-system has its own logic of conflict and competition which cannot simply be reduced to particular form of economic competition. Warfare is the open manifestation of this, and it is remarkable how little Marxism has seriously been able to come to terms with war. It has implicitly treated war as an ‘exceptional’ condition, and ignored the extent to which the extreme circumstance highlights the nature of the ‘normal’. What the circumstances of war have shown, never more vividly than in modern times, is that however much states need economic resources to set them in motion, once this has happened the logic of competitive violence is stronger than any economic logic. It can be argued that this logic is almost as important in peacetime, when it is often latent or implicit, as in war itself.

### AT: Neolib

#### The negative’s monolithic theorization of neoliberalism is misguided and counterproductive – it makes positive political change impossible and undermines the alt’s ability to solve

**Barnett 05** (Clive, Professor of Geography @ Open University, PhD Oxford, “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism”, Geoforum, 36.1)

3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistanceor contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of “democracy” (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of “individualized collective-action” (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal hegemony”: environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political actionthat does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of “neoliberalism” are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of “neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale” (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of “getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of “neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

#### No structural violence impact – the neg’s authors are overly pessimistic and discount the ability to make globalization better through things like the plan

**Aisbett, Crawford School of Economics and Government lecturer, 2007**

(Emma, “Why Are the Critics So Convinced That Globalization Is Bad for the Poor?”, March, <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0113.pdf>)

This paper has attempted to explain why criticisms of globalization’s impact on the poor continue to abound despite the general consensus that liberalization promotes growth and growth is good for the poor. The explanation consisted of four parts. First, many people view the empirical evidence in favor of globalization skeptically because they see globalization as a process through which power is concentrated upward and away from the poor. In particular, they see transnational corporations as gaining a disproportionate amount of both political and market power. Critics of globalization are also ﬁrmly of the opinion that corporations will use their increased power in ways that beneﬁt themselves and harm the poor. Although these concerns are not without basis, there are mediating factors that make it diﬃcult to conclude that globalization is increasing corporate power or that increased corporate power is necessarily bad for the poor. On the ﬁrst point it is important to remember that globalization exposes many previously powerful national corporations to outside competition, and requires greater transparency in government policymaking. On the second point, it may be that the eﬃciency beneﬁts of large corporations outweigh any losses from increased market power. Thus, it would seem that there is room for more empirical research to determine whether the corporate globalization does indeed give the poor cause for concern. The next part of the explanation focused on the multiplicity of meanings of the phrases “worsening poverty” and “increasing inequality.” The discussion in regard to poverty followed on from Kanbur’s (2001) work, which identiﬁed four major diﬀerences between the concepts of poverty employed by globalization’s critics and proponents. These four dimensions are the total number of poor versus poverty incidence, monetary versus multidimensional measures, level of aggregation, and time horizon. I argued that although level of aggregation and time horizon do appear to be important distinctions, they are both emblematic of a more general concern that the poor should not be the ones to bear the adjustment costs of globalization. I then examined the implications of each of these diﬀerent concepts for the assessment of the progress of the last twenty years. It was argued that invariably some groups of poor are adversely aﬀected by globalization, even when a much larger number of poor are made better oﬀ. Thus, concern for negatively aﬀected subgroups will always lead to a less favorable assessment of the impact of globalization. In the presence of strong population growth, looking at total number of poor rather than poverty incidence also leads to a predictably more pessimistic assessment. However, the implications of including nonmonetary dimensions of poverty are less clear. Many people clearly believe that liberalization will lead to negative impacts on nonmonetary dimensions of poverty, but the empirical evidence on this is mixed. In regard to inequality I argued that economic research generally applies measures of the shape of the income distribution, while many of the criticisms of globalization are based on polarization and on changes in absolute inequality. The latter concept is related to the observation that the poor often do not have equal access to the opportunities presented by globalization (Birdsall 2003; Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004). Both polarization and absolute changes in inequality tend to indicate rising inequality more often than the measures of inequality preferred by economists. The next section showed that there remain important unresolved methodological issues in the calculation of even the most fundamental poverty and inequality measures. Foremost among these issues are the use of household survey data versus national accounts data to estimate average national incomes, and the method of comparing incomes across countries and over time. Both of these issues have major implications for our assessment of the last twenty years. Until we reach a consensus on them, there will be empirical support for both optimistic and pessimistic views of the period of globalization. Global trends over the last twenty years, however, are not the best facts on which to base claims about the beneﬁts or otherwise of globalization. Thorough empirical work, which links speciﬁc policy measures to poverty outcomes, provides a far better basis. The empirical work to date has contributed to a broad acceptance that trade and FDI are growth promoting. Yet much work remains to show which policies can reduce the adjustment costs borne by the poor and maximize the share of the beneﬁts they obtain from globalization. Overall it seems that the diﬀerence of opinion between globalization’s supporters and critics can be largely explained by diﬀerences in prior views and priorities, as well as current ambiguities in the empirical evidence. Rather than viewing criticism as a burden to be thrown oﬀ as quickly as possible, policymakers and researchers alike could do well to heed its message: “good” isn’t good enough. We owe it to the world’s poor to do better.